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CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIFE STORY
Brian Scott Ballard

Should we understand our lives as stories? Narrativism answers Yes, a
view that has recently been the subject of vigorous debate. But what should
Christian philosophers make of narrativism? In this essay, I argue that, in
fact, narrativism is a commitment of Christian teaching. I argue that there
are practices which Christians have decisive reasons to engage in, which
require us to see our lives as narratives, practices such as confession and
thanksgiving.

“Our graves that hide us from the searching sun,” writes Sir Walter
Raleigh, “Are like drawn curtains when the play is done.” Here, Raleigh
is invoking a familiar metaphor: Life is a story, and we are its protagonists. Over the last forty years, however, many philosophers have come
to see this as more than a metaphor. Life really is a story, they say, and it
is important that we come to see it that way. Consider a recent sampling:
What matters most to me about my life story . . . is that I get to write it. I
don’t like to think I am just performing a script handed to me by history.
I prefer to think of myself as the scriptwriter, inventing my life as I live it, by
living it.1
[O]ur lives exist also in this space of questions, which only a coherent narrative can answer. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a
notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.2
[W]e are all virtuoso novelists, who find ourselves engaged in all sorts of
behaviour, and we always try to put the best ‘faces’ on it we can. We try to
make all of our material cohere into a single good story. And that story is our
autobiography. The chief fictional character at the centre of that autobiography is one’s self.3

Velleman, On Being Me, 44.
Taylor, Sources of the Self, 47.
3
Dennett, “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity,” 114. For views similar to Dennett’s,
see Bruner, Acts of Meaning; Eakin, Living Autobiographically; McAdams, Power, Intimacy, and
the Life Story; Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves; and Velleman, “The Self as Narrator.”
1
2
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Each of these authors highlights a different good. Velleman highlights
something like authenticity; Taylor, the intelligibility of one’s life; and
Dennett, one’s sense of identity. But each author thinks the chosen good
depends, in part, on our ability to self-narrate, to see our lives as stories
and to gain some sense of how the story is going. The view that some such
“existential” good is enhanced, somehow, by our self-narrating we may
call narrativism.
Although Velleman, Taylor, and Dennett are talking about quite distinct goods, it is worth seeing their views as variants of a single emerging
idea. That’s because many of the objections raised against their particular
views—say, the view that self-narrating is important for a sense of identity—would apply no matter which good was highlighted. For instance,
Galen Strawson, a zealous critic of narrativism, argues that autobiographical memory is too unreliable for self-narrating to be ethically important.4
And while Strawson is explicitly addressing the idea that self-narrating is
vital to our sense of self, clearly his point would apply to whatever value
we attach to self-narrating. So, narrativists, for all their differences, face
many of the same objections. They also face many of the same burdens
in formulating their views. For instance, what exactly is narrativity? How
conscious must we be of our self-narratives? Is self-narrating necessary or
sufficient (or both) for the relevant good? Is there such thing as the story of
a life, or can any given life be narrated in dramatically different and even
conflicting ways? On the face of it, there is no reason in principle to think
the various narrativists—in spite of their diversity—will end up with different answers to these and other questions. Thus, there is good reason
to shelter these scattered narrativist views beneath a single program of
research.5
And scattered they are. Just consider the diverse range of goods
invoked. In addition to authenticity, intelligibility, and a sense of self—the
goods already mentioned—grasping life narratives has been said to be
important for finding meaning,6 for offering forgiveness,7 for reconciling
with our disappointments,8 for understanding ourselves and others across
our deepest divides,9 for membership in a community,10 and indeed for
having any agency at all.11
What should Christians make of this enthusiasm for narrative? Is
narrativism congruent with Christian values? Or is it perhaps a mere
fad, an expression of the spirit of the age? After all, the idea that life
Strawson, “Against Narrativity.”
But note that the questions raised here will not be taken up in the present essay.
6
Fischer, Our Stories, Chs. 8–10; Kauppinen, “Meaningfulness and time”; Nozick,
“Happiness”; and Velleman, “Well-Being and Time.”
7
Griswald, Forgiveness.
8
Rosati, “The Story of a Life.”
9
Williams, Truth and Truthfulness.
10
Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives.
11
MacIntyre, After Virtue.
4
5
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is a story is often one way of saying that there are no ultimate truths,
only stories, where everyone has a different even if incommensurable
story to tell. And I take it most Christians will find such pluralism unacceptable. Moreover, the preoccupation with self and authenticity, which
we find in so many narrativist accounts, seems to reflect a distinctively
modern and secular individualism, at best alien to the Christian tradition, at worst allied to our culture’s self-obsession that so many critics have bemoaned. Indeed, if the ethical or broadly eudaimonistic
value of self-narrating is some newfangled idea—perhaps a product of
Romanticism—then any Christian committed to orthodoxy may rightly
regard it with suspicion.
In spite of these initial reservations, however, the idea that there is
great value in seeing our lives as narratives, and in giving those narratives
some articulation, has a profound basis in Christian teaching. Indeed,
not only does narrativism find support within Christianity; Christianity
makes it unavoidable. That, at any rate, is what I wish to argue in this essay.
Christians are rationally committed to narrativism. Call this the commitment
thesis. By this, I do not mean that narrativism is a defining doctrine of
Christianity, or even that it is logically entailed by such doctrines. I mean,
rather, that if Christianity is true, then we have decisive reasons to narrate our lives, and therefore to view such self-narrating as a good thing.
This, I claim, is what we should conclude in light of the biblical data and
Christian tradition.
The commitment thesis is of inherent interest to Christian ethics. If the
commitment thesis is right, then acquiring some sense of one’s narrative
is a vital part of Christian living, an insight which has so far been mostly
ignored, even by so-called narrative theologians (to be discussed shortly).
But there is another significance of the commitment thesis, which is simply that narrativism is a substantive commitment. Thus, if narrativism is
right, that’s confirmation for Christianity; if wrong, disconfirmation. This
is, then, a place where Christianity sticks its neck out. And accordingly,
Christian philosophers—not to mention their opponents—have a stake in
an emerging debate between narrativism and what Strawson calls episodic
ethics (the denial of narrativism).12 Since this debate has been so far completely ignored by Christian philosophy, one goal of the present essay is to
flag this as an area awaiting exploration.
I admit, of course, that the concept of narrative has made its rounds
in Christian thought and the philosophy of religion more broadly. But
the idea that narrativism can be supported from within Christianity itself
remains entirely unexplored. For example, some have argued that the
Christian narrative is meant to shape the cognitive content of our emotions;13 that narrative can enrich comparative philosophy of religion

12
13

Strawson, “Episodic Ethics.”
Roberts, “Joys” and Spiritual Emotions.
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by capturing lived experience within different religious systems;14 that
narrative can help us deal with familiar skeptical challenges such as the
argument from evil;15 that Christian moral teaching can be understood
only in the context of the Christian narrative;16 that narrative has an
important role to play in Christian apologetics;17 and that it’s in virtue
of its narrative character that Christianity renders life meaningful.18 But
nowhere has the concept of narrative figured more prominently than in
the work of narrative theologians since the 1970s. Now, narrative theology covers a hodgepodge of ideas, but all of them orbit around the thesis
that Christianity is itself a kind of narrative. For instance, Niehbur claims
that the Christian narrative cannot be fully translated into abstract principles, so that attention to its narrative form is required for theologians.19
Hans Frei claims that Christianity is a sort of cosmic narrative in terms
of which the believer must come to experience the world and her life in
it.20 And Stanley Hauerwas claims that the Christian narrative is meant
to shape the character of the believer in order to allow her to confront her
own sin without self-deception and unite with others in community.21 In
claiming this, to be sure, Hauerwas has sometimes expressed the narrativist position. For instance, he says that the self is a narrative;22 at other
times, that the self is formed by narratives.23 But he relies on philosophical
arguments—appealing for instance to the work of Alastair MacIntyre—to
support these narrativist theses, then applies narrativism to Christian ethics.24 In contrast, I wish to consider the support for narrativism from within
Christianity. In spite of all the buzz about narrative in Christian thought,
this issue has yet to be explored.25 To what extent does Christianity tell us
to understand our lives as stories, and to give those stories articulation?
The commitment thesis answers: to a very great extent. And it must be
emphasized, this answer is logically independent of all the claims about
narrative mentioned above.
This essay proceeds as follows. I will examine various Christian practices and argue they require us to self-narrate. These practices include
confession (section 1), thanksgiving (section 2), the sharing of personal
Burley, “Narrative Philosophy of Religion.”
Stump, Wandering in Darkness.
16
McClendon, “Narrative Ethics and Christian Ethics.”
17
McGrath, Narrative Apologetics.
18
Seachris, “The Meaning of Life and Scripture’s Redemptive-Historical Narrative” and
“The Meaning of Life as Narrative.”
19
Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation.
20
Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.
21
Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, Chs. 8–11.
22
Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, 228.
23
Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, 233.
24
See, for example, Hauerwas, The Work of Theology, Ch. 4.
25
Those familiar with the work of Anthony Rudd will know that he has relied on
Kierkegaard to develop his narrativist views. However, far from deriving his narrativism
from Kierkegaard’s Christianity, Rudd has been careful precisely to distance the two. See, for
instance, Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative, 46.
14
15
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testimony (section 3), and the contemplation of the afterlife (section 4).
Each of these practices is a requirement of Christian moral teaching, the
only exception being the sharing of personal testimony (the narrative
of one’s spiritual progress). But while that practice is not required, it is
something Christians have reasons to do, as I shall argue. Accordingly, my
argument for the commitment thesis can be understood as follows:
(1) If Christianity is true, we thereby have reason to Φ.
(2) In order to Φ, we must self-narrate.
(3) So, if Christianity is true, we thereby have reason to self-narrate.
A little tinkering is needed to make the argument strictly valid, but that
its structure is convincing can be seen by the following example which
mirrors it: If its being my daughter’s birthday gives me a reason to bake
her a cake, and the only way to do that is to stop by the grocer, then its
being my daughter’s birthday gives me a reason to stop by the grocer.
Thus, the only question for us is whether there are Christian practices we
can plug in for Φ in order to generate true premises. The rest of this essay
is devoted to arguing there are. Note that the four practices I’ll discuss are
independently sufficient to establish my verdict, so someone who wishes
to deny the commitment thesis will have to refute four independent arguments based on the schema above.
1. CONFESSION
Christianity requires that believers confess their sins, the standard means
by which God’s forgiveness is sought. “If we confess our sins,” John the
Evangelist tells us, “he is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and
purify us from all unrighteousness.”26 For most of Christian history, such
confession has been practiced as verbal and habitual, and there are good
reasons for this, reasons internal to Christian teaching, as I will lay out
shortly. Of course, not all Christian denominations practice confession in
the same way. But there remains a stable core: describing one’s sins for
the sake of absolution, as an expression of contrition. This is true whether
the Christian is a Catholic sitting in a confessional booth, or a Charismatic
evangelical speaking directly to God.27
Confession obviously has something to do with narrative. In the paradigm case, to confess is to narrate some episode of behavior or perhaps
some pattern of behavior. The narrative need not be especially vivid or
artful. It can be as simple as “Once, I stole some pears.” Of course, to narrate disparate episodes is hardly to narrate one’s life. It doesn’t even require
one to see one’s life as a story, for the same reason that a collection of

26
1 John 1:9. See also James 5:16, Acts 19:18, and 2 Peter 3:9, just to mention the New
Testament. All Bible quotes are from the English Standard Version.
27
If there is any doubt that unspoken thoughts can be properly considered verbal, see
Langland-Hassan and Vicente, Inner Speech.
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folktales is not itself a folktale. However, Christian confession asks for
more than the narration of disparate episodes. Christianity is telling us
to adopt a narrative orientation towards our past, both near and far; to be
prepared to make verbal and explicit our behaviors; to be highly reflective about the inner life that underwrites those behaviors; and crucially,
to bring to bear on this narrating of behavior and inner life the concepts
of the gospel—creation, fall, and redemption. Seemingly disparate episodes are thus brought together in a narrative of God’s grace and human
need. And the themes of sin and redemption unify them in the mind of
the believer. For, these themes give the very rationale for confessing in the
first place. In every act of confession, one invokes the story of the fall, and
locates one’s life within it, as one more thing in its wreckage; and in every
hearing of pardon, one hears the story of Christ’s resurrection, in which
sin and death were overcome, and locates one’s life in its restorative light.
Confession, then, doesn’t just leave the Christian with a pile of unrelated
episodes, or “a great barn of facts,” as Bernard Williams put it in another
context.28 It brings them together in a unified story.
Confession points us to a more fundamental sense in which the
Christian must narrate her past. For, confession expresses contrition, that
emotion in which the believer is moved with sorrow over her sin.29 It is
plausible that contrition, in its outlook, is always narrative. To be contrite
is to see or somehow grasp one’s actions as culpable, and this requires
some awareness of what has been done. But to be aware of what has been
done is to be aware of an event and to have some sense of how it unfolded;
and that awareness amounts to a narrative, however minimal. Further, if
one is contrite, one’s action is seen as sinful, and this becomes part of the
narrative. One sees one’s action in terms of its offensiveness to a God who
demands right living. And thus, Christian contrition, by its very logic,
narrates one’s actions using this theological backdrop. The act of confession makes this narrative explicit, and allows the believer to complete the
narrative as one in which she is forgiven.
Christianity, then, gives us reasons to feel contrition, and reasons to practice confession, both of which require self-narrating. These reasons are decisive, since contrition and confession remain central to the Christian life.
Some hold there is a universal need to confess, a need “to speak openly
about oppressive secrets.”30 Whether that’s so, confessional practices can
be found in every major religion,31 and to that extent, other religions may
also require their adherents to narrate their lives. This, however, does not
conflict with the commitment thesis. If Christianity gives us reasons to
self-narrate, that doesn’t mean no other religion does.
Is it too restrictive to require that confession is verbal? Imagine someone forms a mental picture of her sin, then says in her thoughts, “I am sorry
Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 241.
For a full analysis of the nature of contrition see Roberts, Spiritual Emotions, Ch. 7.
30
Berggren, The Psychology of Confession, 3.
31
See the essays in Etzioni and Carney, Repentance.
28
29
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for that.” Does this count as verbal? Of course, the demonstrative reference
is verbal, but the behavior confessed is represented imagistically. Even in
that case, however, the image is still a representation of what has occurred. So
this shows, at most, that one can narrate using imagery—hardly surprising in this age of film and comic books. And if the requirement of verbal
confession is too strict, it is only because there are, in principle, non-verbal
ways of self-narrating. Still, verbal self-narrating remains the most natural
means of confession, because of its ability to recover the nuances of the
inner life, as I will discuss shortly.
A more serious complication is that I have assumed Christian confession
to be narrative and habitual. Certain debunkers, however, have claimed
that confession was not practiced this way until as late as the sixth century.32 Before that, confession was not verbal and did not even represent
the narrative details of one’s past: It was merely acted out through public
self-humiliation. And it was not habitual: After baptism, the believer only
got one “second repentance,” and from there, it was exile from the church.
How damaging is this to what I have said so far? Certainly, the early
church saw vocal defenders of the model of penance just described
(Tertullian, to mention a prominent example).33 But we should note there
is evidence of regular, private, verbal confession—the sharing of “bosom
secrets,” as John Cassian puts it—much earlier than the debunkers admit,
evidence they seem to be unaware of.34 Further, even non-verbal, performative confession expresses contrition, which is narrative in its outlook, as
I have argued. Finally, and most importantly, my claim is that Christian
confession as it is meant to be practiced involves the believer in self-narration.
I do not claim it is always practiced as it is meant to be practiced. Indeed,
in spite of what recent defenders of Tertullian say,35 the biblical data does
seem to call for confession that is verbal, habitual, and ultimately narrative. There are numerous biblical texts we might cite here, and doubtless anyone familiar with the Bible already has some in mind. We might
mention, for instance, that the Lord’s prayer—which Jesus instructs us
to use, and presumably more than once or twice—asks for forgiveness of
“debts” or “trespasses” (opheilēma). But the most decisive point seems to
be this. Sin is viewed in the New Testament as starting in the depths of the
inner life. To murder is to think meanly of others. To commit adultery is
to lust. Those two examples are particularly relevant, because Tertullian
himself singles out murderers and adulterers as not to be readmitted to
32
Foucault, “Christianity and Confession”; Mortimer, The Origins of Private Penance in the
Western Church; Taylor, The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault; Tentler, Sin and
Confession on the Eve of the Reformation.
33
See Coxe, On Repentance. See also Kimmel, “Comparative Confession,” who brings out
just how distinctive Tertullian’s view is compared with other approaches to penance.
34
See Oakley, Celtic Penance, “The Origins of Irish Penitential Discipline,” and “The
Origins of Private Penance in the Western Church.” See also Watkins, A History of Penance,
447–448.
35
Notably, Osborn, Tertullian, Ch. 8.
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the church. But it is hard to believe that many congregants—or any, for
that matter—will be able to go for long without committing such inward
sins. In protecting the church, then, Tertullian merely empties it. But while
the New Testament expects the church to be pure, it also expects there
to be a church. Thus, confession will have to be habitual, since thoughts
and desires will frequently stray into sin. And confession will have to be
verbal, since there is no other viable way for thoughts and desires to be
expressed with the detail and regularity that confession calls for.36
This last point is worth elaborating in light of another fairly natural objection: Must Christian confession narrate the particulars of what one has done
(or thought, or felt, or wanted)? Must it even narrate events at all? Certainly,
there are many examples of Christian confessions that are highly generic,
as the Lord’s prayer already illustrates. Likewise, Samuel Johnson records
the following sort of confession not infrequently in his diary: “Forgive, O
merciful Lord, whatever I have done contrary to thy laws.”37
I grant there is a place for such confessions, which acknowledge our
general status as sinners before God, and which admit to sins beyond
our awareness. But two features of Christian thought, taken together,
require the believer to go beyond these generic confessions and articulate the details of his moral failures, at least with some kind of regularity. The first feature is that the self is seen as capacious, containing hidden
depths. Jeremiah writes, “The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately sick; who can understand it?”38 And the Psalmist cries, “Search
me, O God, and know my heart! Try me and know my thoughts! And see
if there be any grievous way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting!”39,
40
The second feature is that the believer is urged to examine this capacious
inner life, and charged with moral responsibility for its contents. He must
“take every thought captive.”41 He must “examine himself.”42 He must
“test his own work.”43, 44 And putting these two features together, we see
36
I mention thoughts and desires, mental states rather than behaviors. But even where it is
mental states being confessed, the believer is still narrating, since mental states are events no
less than behaviors are. Coveting the donkey of one’s neighbor is as much an event as stealing
it. For, even when such coveting is a standing disposition, the disposition will be something
to confess only if made occurrent in consciousness.
37
Johnson, The Works of Samuel Johnson, 138.
38
Jer. 17:9.
39
Ps. 139:23–24.
40
It’s worth adding that this capacious self is a theme Augustine worries repeatedly in his
Confessions, that “man is a great depth,” that one can hardly number the feelings of his heart,
that the self can be lost even to itself, because it is a thing more boundless than the seas and
the mountains. For notable discussion of this feature of Augustine’s thought, see Brown,
Augustine of Hippo, 178–179; Misch, History of Autobiography in Antiquity, 633–646; and Olney,
Memory and Narrative, 51–52.
41
2 Cor. 10:5.
42
1 Cor. 11:28.
43
Gal. 6:4
44
This Christian variant of know thyself would figure in Christian ethics throughout the
centuries. In his On the Trinity, for instance, Augustine writes that the knowledge of oneself
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that the Christian is made responsible for examining a complex and contoured inner world. Such examination will strive to be—it will fail, but
it will strive to be—as sophisticated as the heart it searches. And when
that examining turns up sinful movements in thought and desire, as it
inevitably will, these will need to be confessed. Typically, that will mean a
detailed rather than generic confession, given the complex nature of what
is being confessed. But even if the confession remains generic—“forgive
me, Father, for I have sinned”—it will at any rate be spurred on by a rich
and intricate recognition of events in one’s inner life, a recognition that is
narrative in its shape for the very reason that it is a recognition of events.
That is why Christianity calls for more than merely generic confession.
Where does this leave us? Christian morality requires contrition and
confession, both of which narrate the believer’s life. For, contrition requires
narrative representation of one’s acts as sinful. And confession should be
understood—in the typical case—as verbal and habitual, making explicit
the narrative of one’s past about which one feels contrition. And since confession is habitual, it thus involves the believer in narrating many events
of her life, including her inner life. But she does not merely narrate them
as unrelated episodes. Rather, she narrates them as a sinner in need of
redemption, and thus these episodes are unified thematically in a broader
narrative of sin and grace.
2. THANKSGIVING
The Psalmist tells us:
Enter his gates with thanksgiving, and his courts with praise! Give thanks
to him; bless his name!
For the Lord is good; his steadfast love endures forever, and his faithfulness
to all generations.45

This call to thanksgiving can be found throughout the Bible. But if
Christianity calls for thanksgiving, it is because it first calls for gratitude. Following Roberts,46 we may say that to feel gratitude is to understand47 oneself as (a) having received a benefit which is (b) undeserved
is to be preferred to the knowledge of the natural sciences (Augustine, On the Trinity, 129).
While some have argued that this is an inheritance from Stoicism (see Misch, History of
Autobiography in Antiquity, Vol. 2, 404–413), what I have emphasized here is that the logic for
self-examination is internal to the Christian worldview, which sees the self as both elusive
yet responsible even for its hidden depths.
45
Ps. 100:4–5.
46
Roberts, “The Blessings of Gratitude.”
47
Roberts’s preferred term is not understanding but construal (Roberts, Emotions), though
he thinks construal is a kind of understanding. Other theorists of emotion prefer perception
or something analogous. For a recent sample of this debate, see Ballard, “Content and the
Fittingness of Emotion”; Milona, “Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously”; and Prinz,
Gut Reactions. Presently, of course, nothing hangs on these details, although I am taking for
granted that emotions involve some manner of evaluative outlook, rather than being brute
sensations.
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and (c) offered deliberately by a beneficiary who (d) has your good in
mind. That is the outlook of gratitude, but gratitude involves more than
an outlook, for it possesses a characteristic motivation, a felt desire to do
something. Specifically, one wants to show or express one’s gratitude, and
where this can take the form of favors returned, more direct is thanksgiving—outright verbal expression. To give thanks is simply to say, more or
less, “thank you for . . .” (where this utterance functions as an expression
of gratitude rather than some point of courtesy).
Gratitude is the Christian emotion par excellence. The central event of
Christianity—the death and resurrection of Jesus—is seen as conferring
an undeserved benefit (salvation, or at least, its possibility) offered by a
beneficiary (God) for our good. But aside from this momentous salvation
event, the Christian also views herself as the beneficiary of many other
undeserved blessings wrought by Providence. She is urged to see many
things in her life as gifts from God, where this is no mere façon de parler.
When Samuel Pepys, in his famous diaries, thanks God for his health and
his marriage and the peace of England, he is doing just what James suggests, when his epistle tells us that “every good gift and every perfect gift
is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.”48
Gratitude and thanksgiving are the positive analogues of contrition
and confession. And like confession, thanksgiving involves the believer in
self-narration. She is to keep watch over her life in search of God’s blessings. She is to make His blessings explicit—that is to say, verbal—to herself, to others, and to the Beneficiary. And to do this, to give thanks, means
narrating events, narrating the occasion of one’s gratitude.
Is it possible to give thanks for something without narrating it? For one,
perhaps thanksgiving can be performed non-narratively. In fact, that is just
what the ancient Israelites seem to be doing in the thanksgiving sacrifice.49
Yet, such thanksgiving is still expressive of gratitude; and gratitude, like
contrition, has an essentially narrative character. This is true even in cases
of gratitude apparently devoid of narrativity. Suppose I am grateful there
are redwood trees on my front lawn. Here, my gratitude is about a state
of affairs that involves no change, no event, and thus nothing to narrate.
In that case, when I say, “thank you, Lord, for those redwood trees on my
front lawn,” am I really narrating? Quite simply, Yes, although the narrative may not be explicit. By the very logic of gratitude, one is grateful for
gifts—things that have been given. Thus, if I am grateful to God for the
redwoods, then I am seeing them—in some sense of “seeing”—as given
by Him. And giving is an event. Narration of events is thus inherent in
gratitude, because gratitude is always about what has been given. Thus,
even where thanksgiving is merely performative, it is still expressing a
narrative outlook.
48
James 1:17. Of course, the command to give thanks can be seen throughout the New
Testament, as in Co. 3:17, Eph. 5:20, and 1 Thess. 5:18.
49
Lev. 7:12.
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Since gratitude has a narrative character, it is no accident that in the
Christian autobiographical tradition, gratitude is often presented as both
the occasion of the writing and its unifying theme, if we take what the
authors say at face value. Augustine is thanking God from the first book
of his Confessions, and affirms in his Retractions that praising God for His
works was a primary motive for writing his life.50 Margery Kempe tells us
that her narrative describes “his wonderful works, how mercifully, how
benignly, and how charitably he moved and stirred a sinful wretch to his
love.”51 Teresa of Ávila writes for “His glory and praise.”52 John Bunyan,
quoting Psalm 78, wants to tell us of the Lord’s “wondrous works,” in
order that “the goodness and bounty of God towards me, may be the more
advanced and magnified before the sons of men.”53 Mary Rowlandson, a
New England woman who survived captivity by American Indians, hesitated to publish her account, “yet her gratitude unto God made her not
hardly persuadable to let it pass, that God might have his due glory.”54
This list could be extended substantially.
Not only, then, does Christian gratitude require us to narrate certain
goods as given by God, but it has long been recognized as the occasion for
doing so, a need felt so urgently that it has literally determined the course
of Western literature (speaking of autobiography, itself a major influence
on the realistic novel). Of course, if some Christians have written autobiographies as acts of thanksgiving, that doesn’t mean all thanksgiving
requires such intricate and demanding narration. After all, Christianity is
for everyone, including—perhaps especially—the illiterate poor. But even
verbal acts of thanksgiving far simpler than spiritual autobiographies are
still ultimately narrative. A sentence as simple as “thank you, Lord, for
this food”—if it is an expression of gratitude rather than mere routine—is
an act of narration, albeit in shorthand. It says: Here is some food, which
I have not deserved but which God has provided for my good. The object of
Christian gratitude, then, even one’s dinner, is seen as part of the sacred
story of God’s provision and our creaturehood.
To sum up, the Christian has decisive reasons to feel gratitude, an emotion which narrates events as given by God. And the Christian has decisive reasons to practice thanksgiving on a habitual basis, which expresses
her gratitude. Further, she has strong reasons—not decisive, but strong—
to practice her thanksgiving verbally, expressing directly the narrative
embedded in her gratitude. Such narrative thanksgiving is not required,
because thanksgiving can in principle be performed or acted out, as
in the sacrifices of ancient Israel. But the believer does have reasons to

Augustine, The Retractions, 130.
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give verbal, narrative thanksgiving, because (a) it is a natural mode of
self-expression, (b) it is modeled by numerous figures in the Bible and
Christian tradition, and (c) it allows the believer to celebrate the particulars
of what God has done in a way that non-verbal, performative thanksgiving cannot. And crucially, such verbal thanksgiving—and the gratitude
it expresses—narrates the events of the believer’s life but does not leave
them unconnected. It binds them, for the believer, under the theme of
God’s providential care, and sets them against the narrative backdrop of
an ongoing relationship with a God who made Himself providential in the
very act of creating dependent animals like us.
3. THE SHARING OF PERSONAL TESTIMONY
One would not have to spend much time at an evangelical church in
America before hearing someone “share her testimony.” By this convention, the believer tells her life story, organized around her coming to know
and follow God. Such stories are often formulated as conversion narratives in which a dramatic encounter with God divides one’s life into before
and after. But they may also be stories in which she has simply always
believed in God, as far as she can recall, and what gets narrated are the
challenges she has faced as a believer and the ways God has helped her
overcome them. Doubtless, too, other sorts of testimonies can be heard.
Is this practice of sharing one’s testimony a quirk of American evangelicalism? Tanya Lurhmann, who studies evangelicals as an anthropologist,
tells us this emphasis on personal testimony is part of a “major shift” in
American Christianity.55 Evangelicals today, she explains, are drawn to
personal testimonies and share them openly because “they are the enactment of a relationship between a creature and his creator, between a dull,
cautious, skeptical human, and a loving, patient, persistent God.”56 Now,
philosophers might wonder whether enactment is the right word there.
But I wish instead to note that the use of personal testimony has a history far more ancient than Lurhmann suggests.57 Bruce Hindmarsh, for
example, identifies a similar before-and-after conversion narrative emerging by the 17th c.58 And the use of personal spiritual narratives—setting
aside the strictly conversion-centered—goes back much farther than that.
Christians have been using hagiography for spiritual edification since the
4th c., when Athanasius penned The Life of Saint Antony, a work prefigured
by martyr narratives such as The Martyrdom of Polycarp in the middle of
the 2nd c., itself prefigured by the New Testament’s use of exemplary lives
of faith, as in Heb. 11. It is in the 2nd c., too, that we find the beginnings
Lurhmann, When God Talks Back, xvi.
Ibid, 9.
57
But to be fair, Lurhmann is aware that there have been other periods of Christianity when
the personal character of faith has been emphasized, as in the various “Great Awakenings” in
the American 19th c. (Lurhmann, When God Talks Back, 14).
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of Christian autobiography in the work of Justin Martyr. And Christian
autobiography will define life writing in the West at least until the 19th
c., a thing worth emphasizing. Quite simply, Christian autobiography
is the single most salient influence on life writing in the West.59 And the
Christian’s drive to write autobiographically has thus animated a major
segment of Western cultural life.
What, then, is behind this drive? It can be understood in terms of three
salient motives: (a) to give thanks for what God has done, (b) to evangelize
to the unconverted, and (c) to edify the church.60 These three motives also
seem to be salient in the contemporary practice of sharing one’s testimony.
Thus, the use of testimony, far from being an idiosyncrasy of American
evangelicalism, is an ancient practice rooted in Christian tradition and the
Bible. I will argue this by elaborating on (b) and (c), since enough has
already been said concerning (a) in the previous section.
Evangelism—sharing the message of Christianity in order to effect
someone’s conversion—has made use of personal testimony from early
Of course, the beginnings of modern autobiography, shorn as it is of any spiritual motivations, can be traced to Rousseau’s Confessions, published in 1782. But this work was met
with revulsion by many critics on the very basis of its lacking spiritual motivations. Even
Descartes’s quasi-autobiographical works, though far from spiritual, at least used the confessional mode as a device for furthering inquiry. It would not be until the 19th c. that audiences would get used to the idea of an autobiography purely devoted to putting the self on
display. Indeed, such reticence in publishing one’s life for its own sake—the sense that to do
so is somehow deeply inappropriate—is fairly common, even in widely differing contexts.
Consider, for instance, Medieval China, where autobiographical writing was highly mediated, even obscured, by artifice designed to manage this reticence (Wang, “Medieval Chinese
Autobiographical Writing”). These connections are worth noting, since, I believe, they suggest there is a sort of natural norm against publishing the self, one which Christianity offers
special license for suspending, thus making possible the Western autobiographical tradition. I don’t mean to suggest, as Georges Gusdorf once did, that autobiography is somehow
uniquely Western (Gusdorf, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography”). Indeed, that notion
is beset by counterexamples on all sides, for instance, from ancient Egypt (Misch, History of
Autobiography in Antiquity, Vol. 1), or classical China (Wu, The Confucian’s Progress), or the
Arab world (Reynolds, Interpreting the Self), or Tibetan Buddhism (Roesler, “Between SelfExpression and Convention”). These make for fascinating comparison with Christian autobiographies—for example, some Tibetan writers narrate their past lives—but such comparison
is of course a work of its own, as is the tracing of Christianity’s influence on this genre. What
is evident, however, is that the desire to write one’s life is fairly widespread, as are the norms
that push against that desire and whose suspension in the West is largely due to Christianity.
60
I think a fourth motive can be discerned, which is simply to celebrate, to relish, what
God has done in the believer’s life. This is distinguished from thanksgiving because, in celebration, one’s status as a recipient of an underserved gift is not salient. Rather, what is salient
is simply the goodness of the gift itself. For example, Mary Rowlandson regards her account
as a “memorandum of God’s dealings with her, that she might never forget, but remember
the same, and the severall circumstances thereof, all the dayes of her life” (Rowlandson, The
Sovereignty and Goodness of God, 65). This echoes the sentiment found in many Psalms, which
exhort us to remember the “wondrous works” of God, often referring to Israel’s sacred history, but other times quite clearly referring to the personal life of the Psalmist. However,
since space is limited, and since this motive for sharing personal testimony is quite similar to
that of thanksgiving—already discussed in section 2—I won’t rely on it in my argument here.
59
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on. Justin Martyr offers a clear example. His Dialogue with Trypho, written between 155 and 161, records a debate that took place in 135 between
Justin and a Jewish activist. A Christian apologetic aimed at Judaism, the
work begins by recounting Justin’s own conversion upon realizing the
inadequacy of Platonism. Here we have an early example of evangelistic
testimony. And yet the earliest examples are found in the ministry of the
Apostle Paul. In Acts 22, when Paul stands before the crowd of Jewish
leaders who have dragged him from the temple in Jerusalem, he recounts
his entire conversion narrative, from his time as Saul of Tarsus, through
the road to Damascus and healing at the hands of Ananias. He does the
same in Acts 26, before King Agrippa. In both cases, he is using personal
testimony to reach the unconverted (King Agrippa responds, basically,
“do you seriously expect me to become a Christian right now?”). Thus, to
the extent that we are to treat Paul as an exemplar of the faith—and this
is encouraged explicitly, for instance, in 1 Cor. 11:1 and 2 Thess. 3:7–9—
we, too, have reason to make use of personal testimony in an evangelistic context, a practice which can be seen as an extension of the New
Testament’s general focus on first-hand accounts in the defense of Christ’s
messiahship.61
If evangelism has motivated the use of personal testimony, all the more
has the edification of the church. Outside the Bible, the earliest example
we have is from The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity,62 an autobiographical
account of St. Perpetua’s awaiting martyrdom. Written at the start of the
3rd c., it opens:
If the old examples of the faith, which testify to the grace of God and lead
to the edification of men, were written down so that by reading them God
should be honored and man comforted—as if through a reexamination of
those deeds—should we not set down new acts that serve each purpose
equally? For these too will some day also be venerable and compelling for
future generations, even if at the present time they are judged to be of lesser
importance, due to the respect naturally afforded the past.63

While this purpose for writing is not stated by Perpetua herself—the
introductory paragraph is written by a redactor—it is significant that this
is how one of her Christian contemporaries understood the value of her
account. Likewise, in the 4th c., Gregory of Nazianzus offers his autobiographical poem to the young
According to Alison Trites, “witness” and its cognates occurs over 200 times in the New
Testament, the disciples bearing witness to Christ’s messiahship as if a court drama were
unfolding in which Christ’s identity were the contested issue (Trites, The New Testament
Concept of Witness). We find this sort of thing, for instance, in 2 Peter 1:16: “For we did not
follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our
Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty.”
62
While the historicity of this text has been disputed, it is vigorously defended in
Heffernan, The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity, 5–6. If historical, it is the earliest writing we
possess by a Christian woman.
63
Heffernan, The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity, 125 (my italics).
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as a kind of pleasant medicine,
an inducement which might lead them to more useful things,
skilfully sweetening the harshness of the commandments:
for a taut bowstring also needs to be relaxed.64

Similar examples abound. Augustine hopes that his Confessions will “rouse
up the heart and prevent it from sinking into the sleep of despair,”65 that
it will “lift up the understanding and affection of men to Him.”66 Angela
of Foligno writes her life story “in order to increase the devotion of His
people.”67 The scribe for Julian of Norwich’s Shewings is sure that “in this
vision are very many comforting and greatly moving words for all those
who desire to be lovers of Christ.”68 Margery Kempe expects her Book to
be “a comforting one for sinful wretches.”69 St. Ignatius, in dictating his
life, was encouraged that “he could do nothing of greater benefit for the
Society [of Jesuits].”70 Mary Rowlandson writes to “enlarge pious hearts
in the praises of God.”71 And John Bunyan, addressing his congregation,
publishes his life “for your further edifying,” in hopes that “others may
be put in remembrance of what he hath done for their souls, by reading
his work upon me.”72 No doubt, further examples can be found. But here
again, they are not limited to extra-biblical texts. Paul himself, although he
doesn’t write full-blown autobiography, uses his life story for the church’s
edification. In Acts 20:17–38, as he prepares to leave Ephesus, Paul reminds
the elders of his ministry with them, in order to encourage them in the true
faith. And in Phil. 1:12–14, Paul describes his imprisonments to embolden
the church in the preaching of the gospel. And in 1 Tim. 1:12–19, Paul
reminds Timothy of the grace Paul has received, so that the young disciple
may “fight the battle well.” In Paul, then, we find someone who made free
use of his personal testimony to build up the church wherever he saw fit.
What Paul is doing in displaying his life story, what Bunyan and
Augustine and Perpetua are doing, is not something fundamentally different from what a modern-day Christian does when she stands up in
church and shares how God has changed her life. The same motives of
thanksgiving, edification, and evangelism remain salient across the centuries. Thus, rather than seeing the practice of testimony as an idiosyncrasy
of American evangelicalism, we should view it as something with deep
roots in Christian tradition. It is, I grant, not something Christians are
required to do, as they are confession and thanksgiving. Nevertheless, it
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is something which they have reasons to do. And it is a practice that obviously requires robust self-narration, because it simply is self-narration.
4. CONTEMPLATION OF THE AFTERLIFE
In one of his finest passages, Richard Baxter advises that
[t]o conceive of God and glory, only as above our conception, will beget but
little love; or as above our love, will produce little joy. Therefore put Christ
no farther from you, than he hath put himself, lest the Divine nature be again
inaccessible. Think of Christ, as in our own glorified nature. Think of glorified saints, as men made perfect. Suppose thyself a companion with John in
his survey of the New Jerusalem, and viewing the thrones, the Majesty, the
heavenly hosts, the shining splendor, which he saw.73

We mustn’t merely think of heaven in the abstract, Baxter says, but must
imagine it concretely enough that we feel the appropriate emotions. Here,
Baxter is only elaborating on a piece of the Christian life practiced in
earnest for centuries and held out in the Bible for all to see, the practice
of contemplating one’s heavenly future. And this practice, I will argue,
requires self-narration.
Christian teaching on the afterlife, in brief, is that those who trust in
Christ will be raised from the dead and will enjoy an everlasting (or is it
eternal?) period of bliss, dwelling with the saints and being at last restored
to that union with God for which we were meant. By “heaven,” I am referring to this picture, rather than some Platonic realm of disembodied harpists. Of course, in spite of an ancient tradition of universal salvation, much
of Christian theology has taught that, for the many who persist in rejecting
God, something far less pleasant awaits. Still, it is the Christian’s heavenly
future which Baxter is telling his readers to envision, for that future is the
basis of a hope that has long been regarded as a core Christian virtue.74
Certainly, many Christians have done what Baxter suggests, reflecting quite deliberately on the details of heaven. Some of this reflection is
literary, amplifying the biblical imagery, as we find in Dante and Milton
and the Pearl poet and other luminaries.75 And some of this reflection is
philosophical. The early church, in spite of all its troubles, spent enormous energy in articulating the theological details of heaven—such as the
nature of the resurrected body—and in defending the credibility of that
picture, a project that continues today.76
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This enthusiasm for reflection on the afterlife has a solid basis in
the Bible, where the contemplation of heaven is seen as a vital piece of
Christian living. Like Baxter, Paul urges:
If then you have been raised with Christ, seek the things that are above,
where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God. Set your minds on things
that are above, not on things that are on earth. For you have died, and your
life is hidden with Christ in God. When Christ who is your life appears, then
you also will appear with him in glory.77

By things above, Paul does not just mean Christian ideals. He means, literally, where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God. It is heaven, our appearing in glory, which we are exhorted zēteite (to seek, search for, desire,
require, demand) and phroneite (to think, observe, direct the mind upon).
And that only scratches the surface, for there are many other biblical texts
that invoke heaven as something to keep in view.78
All that is to say: The believer has decisive reasons to contemplate her
heavenly future. But what exactly is the believer doing, in contemplating
this? She isn’t just picturing some final state of the cosmos. She is picturing
the final state of her life. She is picturing the end of her story, or at least, the
story of her earthly existence.79 And to do this, to see heaven as the end of
one’s life, is thereby to see one’s life as a narrative and to have some view
of its final chapter. In contemplating heaven, then, the believer narrates
her life.
One’s heavenly future—that final chapter—has a tight narrative connection to one’s present, not only because they are causally related, but
also because they are thematically related. The problems one faces here
on earth, the troubles and pains that make for that “miserable condition of Man,” as Donne lamented, are promised to be worked out in that
heavenly future, where every tear is wiped away, where the desires of
our hearts are satisfied. And this is plausibly seen as a form of narrative
closure. Noel Carroll argues that narrative closure is what occurs when all
the questions that a narrative saliently poses are answered.80 Well, one’s
present life poses many questions. Every problem poses the question of
whether it will be solved; every wrong, whether it will be made right.
And the doctrine of heaven gives an answer: Yes, by the power of God, it
Col. 3:1–4. Thanks to Wayne Alder for insightful discussion of this text.
To offer just a few examples, see 1 Cor. 2:9, Heb. 11:16, Matt. 6:19–21, 2 Peter 3:13, and
1 Tim. 6:17–19.
79
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will. Not just for the world, but for the individual believer. Thus, for the
Christian, not only does heaven end her story; it gives her story satisfying
closure as well.
The point is worth amplifying. We are told that the blessings of this life
are but a shadow of things to come.81 The good of heaven in some sense
flows out of the present. Indeed, that heaven is not just some place where
things happen to be good, that it is rather where the bad is made right, was
widely noted by early theologians. Gregory of Nyssa thought there was a
yearning all people had—“a common movement in all souls”—for the life
that heaven offers.82 Augustine tells us that the world will be “remade”
and so will we,83 and elsewhere, that in reaching heaven, the Christian
has finally returned to that “homeland” which he has sought in all his
wanderings.84 And Origen tells us that “the end is always like the beginning.”85 In short, as Brian Daley puts it, Christian eschatology means faith
“in the resolution of the unresolved, in the tying up of all the loose ends
that mar the life of the believer in the world.”86 Indeed, in the remarks
quoted above, we may distinguish three senses in which heaven ties up
the loose ends. First, in heaven, the partial goods of this earth are brought
to fullness. Second, in heaven, our deepest yearnings are fulfilled. Third,
in heaven, suffering and evil are set right. These are three senses in which
there is a thematic and therefore narrative connection between heaven and
the present life. But if heaven is a future narratively connected to one’s life
now, then one’s life now becomes a narrative in virtue of that very connection. And to see heaven as the ending of one’s life is to grasp one’s life as a
narrative in that very act of seeing.
Imagine someone who lives entirely in the present. His consciousness
encompasses little of past or future; he is wholly absorbed in the demands
of the day. Further, he does not experience his life as belonging to a single
enduring self. That youth, that boy from thirty years ago, staring back at
him from the photograph—he hardly knows him. He feels no connection
psychologically to that past. But now imagine that such an “episodic,” as
Strawson would call him, sets his mind on things above. Suddenly, he is
aware of his present, this day, this hour, this man he has become, as standing in relation to a future. And that man in the future shall be him, the same
man, for it is he who shall be resurrected and who shall see the face of God.
His storyless present is suddenly opened out into a narrative. For, his present is now, as he sees it, standing in causal and thematic relations to his
future, a future in clear view. They are causal relations because the one leads
to the other. They are thematic relations because the problems of the one are
resolved in the other, the yearnings of the past man projected as fulfilled.
Heb. 10:1.
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To sum up, then, Christian moral teaching requires the believer to contemplate her heavenly destiny, not just to think about it but to wrap her
emotions around it, to be shaped by the hope of heaven.87 But, psychologically speaking, this means she is seeing her life as a narrative and getting
the end in view, an ending which gives profound closure, perhaps maximal closure, to the story she has lived.
5. CONCLUSION
Narrativism—the view that it is ethically important, in some way, to
see one’s life as a story and to gain some sense of what the story is—has
emerged in moral philosophy as a matter of contention. In light of this, it
is significant that Christianity, if true, commits us to narrativism. My argument for this is that certain practices, which Christians have reasons to
engage in—decisive reasons, in some cases—require the Christian to narrate her life. These practices include confession, thanksgiving, the sharing
of personal testimony, and the contemplation of the afterlife. Thus, the
Christian’s reasons for engaging in these practices are also reasons for narrating her life in the ways these practices require.
I’ll end by suggesting four further avenues worthy of exploration,
though their full treatment will obviously require works of their own.
Here I merely gesture at them.
First, a further practice worth considering is the remembrance of sacred
history. It is surprising just how underexplored this practice is in Christian
ethics, given its centrality in scripture. All through the Bible, we are told
to remember God’s works, to recall the sacred history of Israel, to bear in
mind the price paid on the cross. We are exhorted not only to remember
these things but to relate them to our present. And if we do this, we are seeing
these distant events as narratively relevant to our own stories, which is
to say, we are giving ourselves a far richer narrative past than we would
otherwise possess, not to mention a past we share collectively. And thus
we are again involved in self-narration. For just as the contemplation of
one’s heavenly destiny narrates our lives by giving them a future, so the
remembrance of sacred history narrates our lives by giving them a past.
Second, it’s worth considering how this might apply to recent Christian
apologetics. If it really is important for us to narrate our lives, then this
psychological or ethical need for narration is something Christianity provides powerful resources for dealing with, as my case so far has illustrated. For, Christianity, being itself a master narrative, gives us the terms
with which to frame our own lesser narratives. We’re told to paint, yes,
but we’re also given a pallet full of colors. This would be, then, one sense
in which Christianity supports our flourishing. Accordingly, perhaps we

87
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Faith and Philosophy

224

have the materials here for a kind of existential argument for faith,88 or
perhaps an argument for pro-theism in the emerging debate over the axiology of God.89
Third, there is the issue of narrativism itself. I mentioned at the outset
a number of problems facing the view. Can Christianity help here? For
instance, Strawson objects, as noted, that autobiographical memory is too
unreliable to be ethically important. And though I have space only to be
suggestive, it seems to me the Christian has something to say here. For the
story of our lives is not one we alone are responsible for narrating. There is
a Great Author. Thus, while we must maintain that we have, or can have,
some grip on the details of our narratives, we may rest assured that God
knows the true story of our lives, however it may elude us. And we may
trust it is a story of redemption, for that is what has been promised, even if
the faultiness of autobiographical memory prevents us from recovering its
details in anything approaching fullness. There is at least one sense, therefore, in which the Christian is better positioned to endorse narrativism.
Finally, what of the worry that narrativism encourages self-absorption
or reflects our unfettered individualism? We can see now that, while this
may be a problem, it needn’t be. For the narrative practices described
here are means of aligning with God. Thus, when the Christian—by giving thanks, by confessing, and so on—grasps her life as a story, she does
not merely grasp it as her own, does not tell it for its own sake, but is
led through it to redemption. “We tell ourselves stories in order to live,”
writes Joan Didion.90 And she was right in more ways than she intended.
We tell our stories that we may know they are His, and in such knowledge
there is life.91
University of Pittsburgh
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